In this paper, we develop a North-South endogenous growth model to examine three phases of development in the South: imitation of Northern products, imitation and innovation and nally, innovation only. In particular, the model has the features of catching up (and potentially overtaking) which are of particular relevance to the Paci c Rim economies. We show that the possible equilibria depend on cross-country assimilation e ects and the ease of imitation. We then apply the model to analyse the impact of R&D subsidies. There are some clear global policy implications which emerge from our analysis. Firstly, because subsidies to Southern innovation bene t the North as well, it is bene cial to the North to pay for some of these subsidies. Secondly, because the ability of the South to assimilate Northern knowledge and innovate depends on Southern skills levels, the consequent spillover bene ts on growth make the subsidising of Southern education by the North particularly attractive. Two key features that determine trading patterns and growth in the global economy are the speed with which the poorer South absorbs scienti c and technical knowledge, and management and commercial skills from the North, and the relative cost of imitating compared to innovating in the South. Knowledge transfers can be increased or impeded by international institutional arrangements and speci c policies that a ect education and training in the South. The incentive to innovate rather than imitate in the South will depend on the international protection of intellectual property rights and on government policies, including subsidies, to encourage innovation in the North and South.
Two key features that determine trading patterns and growth in the global economy are the speed with which the poorer South absorbs scienti c and technical knowledge, and management and commercial skills from the North, and the relative cost of imitating compared to innovating in the South. Knowledge transfers can be increased or impeded by international institutional arrangements and speci c policies that a ect education and training in the South. The incentive to innovate rather than imitate in the South will depend on the international protection of intellectual property rights and on government policies, including subsidies, to encourage innovation in the North and South.
This paper examine these issues by developing an endogenous growth NorthSouth model driven by knowledge spillovers which is then used to analyse the impact of various R&D subsidies. Our model builds on the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991) (henceforth G&H), but extends it in an important direction. G&H develop North/South models in which the South imitates the North. Such models incorporate the traditional relationship between North and South; but they are less appropriate for the analysis of relationships between the mature industrial economies (OECD) and the rapidly growing economies of the Paci c Rim which are becoming innovators in their own right.
Our model is the rst two-bloc endogenous growth model to examine and integrate three phases of development: innovation in the North with imitation in the South; innovation in the North with both imitation and innovation in the South; and nally innovation in both blocs. The key factors that determine which phase is appropriate are, rst, the degree to which copying is easier than innovation for a given stock of knowledge capital and, second, the relative stocks of knowledge capital per worker. The latter in turn depends on the rate of assimilation of one region's innovations into the knowledge capital of the other.
Two parameters in the model capture these e ects: a c =a which is the relative cost of copying compared to innovating in the South and de ned as the rate of assimilation of Northern innovations into Southern knowledge capital. These two parameters, alongside the other parameters characterizing consumer preferences, also endogenize the balance in the South between innovation and imitation and enable us to address the impact of government in the form of subsidies.
The main result on subsidies is that, in the phase of development with both innovation and imitation in the South, a subsidy to imitation in the South or innovation in the North can lower the global steady-state growth rate. A subsidy to Southern innovation, however, raises the global steady-state growth rate and can bring about a transition to the phase with innovation in both the North and the South. There are some clear global policy implications which emerge from our analysis. Firstly, because the subsidies to Southern innovation bene t the North as well, it may well be in the interests of the North to pay for some of these subsidies, perhaps through transfer programs organized through the IMF and/or World Bank. Secondly, the bene ts of education should feed directly into the ability of the South to assimilate Northern knowledge and innovate; the consequent spillover e ects to growth and welfare make the subsidising of Southern education by the North particularly attractive.
But because of these knowledge spillovers and the associated externalities, policies aimed at fostering innovation and growth may be ine cient or suboptimal if they remain uncoordinated at an international level. This means that the institutions and associated rules that govern these policies matter for the growth performance of the international economy. Since ine ciencies may in uence the rate of growth as well as the level of output, the costs of ine cient policies may be very high. These issues are the subject of continuing research by the authors. 1. Introduction Two key features that determine trading patterns and growth in the global economy are the speed with which the poorer South absorbs scienti c and technical knowledge, and management and commercial skills from the North, and the relative cost of imitating compared to innovating in the South. Knowledge transfers can be increased or impeded by international institutional arrangements and speci c policies that a ect education and training in the South. The incentive to innovate rather than imitate in the South will depend on the international protection of intellectual property rights and on government policies, including subsidies, to encourage innovation in the North and South.
This paper examine these issues by developing an endogenous growth NorthSouth model driven by knowledge spillovers which is then used to analyse the impact of various R&D subsidies. Our model builds on the work of Grossman & Helpman (1991) (henceforth G&H), but extends it in an important direction. G&H develop North/South models in which the South imitates the North. Such models incorporate the traditional relationship between North and South; but they are less appropriate for the analysis of relationships between the mature industrial economies (OECD) and the rapidly growing economies of the Paci c Rim. Table 1 indicates how South Korea and Taiwan, two leading Paci c Rim economies, are now emerging as centres of R&D activity and new product development. By comparing the ratio of R&D expenditure in GDP, the annual compound growth in R&D expenditure, and patents granted to residents of Taiwan and South Korea with two other typical advanced OECD countries, USA and UK, we can see that the former group is becoming a focus of innovation in its own right.
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To analyse the interaction between Northern innovators and Southern imitators and innovators thus requires a model that allows for the possibility of both imitation and innovation in the latter region; developing a model that has this feature is the central contribution of this paper.
Various other models along`new' growth theory lines have been developed to describe North/South interactions. Initially these took the traditional focus of the South as not being an innovator (G&H, Chapter 11, Segerstrom, Anant & Dinopolous (1990) ). This has been followed by`leapfrogging models' which assume that the South, while starting o as an imitator, may become an innovator instead (Chou & Shy (1991) , Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) , Brezis, Krugman & Tsiddon (1993) ). Segerstrom (1991) , in a closed-economy model, shows that an equilibrium with both imitation and innovation involving collusion between rms can exist. The prospect of collusion then provides an incentive to engage in costly imitation. In the North-South model of G&H it is the absence of factor price equalization and the ability of Southern rms with lower wage costs to price Northern rms out of the markets that provide this incentive, and we retain this structure.
Our model is the rst two-bloc endogenous growth model to examine and integrate three phases of development: innovation in the North with imitation in the South; innovation in the North with both imitation and innovation in the South; and nally innovation in both blocs. The key factors that determine which phase is appropriate are, rst, the degree to which copying is easier than innovation for a given stock of knowledge capital and, second, the relative stocks of knowledge capital per worker. The latter in turn depends on the rate of assimilation of one region's innovations into the knowledge capital of the other. Figure 1 below (p. 11) summarizes this dependency. The parameter is the rate of assimilation of Northern innovations by the South into Southern knowledge capital and ! 1 is the extreme of instant assimilation. The parameter a c =a is lower the easier it is to copy rather than innovate in the South. Thus for su ciently low and a c =a, a region of imitation dominates. For an intermediate range, a region of both innovation and imitation dominates. These two parameters, alongside the other parameters characterizing consumer preferences, also endogenize the balance in the South between innovation and imitation and enable us to address the impact of government in the form of subsidies.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out our model and focuses particularly on the treatment of knowledge capital and the spillover e ects. Section 3 examines the steady-state equilibria, and the transitional dynamics are discussed in section 4. Section 5 examines the e ect of subsidies to innovation or imitation in all three phases of development and section 6 provides conclusions and suggestions for future research.
The Model
There are two regions: North and South. Both economies consist of a monopolistic competitive production sector and a competitive sector conducting R&D.
n N varieties were invented and are now produced in the North. n S are produced in the South and of these n S i originated in the South from innovation and n S c were copied from the North (where the subscripts i and c represent innovation and copying respectively). Thus the total number of varieties available to consumers in both regions is n = n N + n S = n N + n S i + n S c . The demand side of the model is entirely standard: consumers have identical preferences world-wide and maximize a utility function which is logarithmic in a Dixit-Stiglitz index with elasticity of substitution " = 1=(1 ? ) > 1 where 2 (0; 1) is the taste parameter. Now consider the R&D sectors. The rates of production of new goods in the North and South, and the transfer of production to the South through copying are given by
where L N , L S i and L S c , and K N and K S denote labour employed and knowledge capital per unit of labour in North and South respectively. The assumption a c < a captures the idea that copying is easier than innovation for a given stock of knowledge capital. We shall eventually assume that a c is a function of the relative size of the copying sector, n S c =n. This relationship is discussed at the end of section 3, but until then we treat it as constant. The treatment of knowledge capital is central both in general to endogenous growth models of this genre, and in particular in our model where we allow for the possible co-existence of innovation and copying (imitation) in the South. The general idea is that each activity in the R&D sector gives rise to both a new blueprint and an addition to society's stock of knowledge capital, which contains new ideas and information that will be useful to later generations of innovators and in our context, imitators.
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Before adopting speci c functional forms it is useful to classify some of the results of G&H. Our rst comment is a general one: G&H proxy knowledge capital by the measure of varieties of di erentiated goods. This leads to the result that growth increases with increasing population size. General observation as well as empirical work (Jones (1995) ) rebuts this result. A more realistic conclusion arises from the observation that innovative research arises not merely from reading journals and the details of patents, but also from interaction between potential inventors. The larger the total population, the smaller is the probability of meeting everyone involved in innovation. Thus it is reasonable to assume that knowledge capital is proportional to the density of varieties within the population. If we de ne this constant of proportionality as , then all the results of G&H remain unaltered apart from replacing population size by . If is the same for all countries, then growth is identical for all countries and the scale e ect, with growth increasing as population size increases, disappears.
Turning now to the functional forms used for knowledge capital, it is useful to contrast the e ects of knowledge capital with and without cross-region spillovers when two regions engage in innovation and production. If there are immediate spillovers of knowledge capital, so that knowledge capital in each region depends on the total measure of all di erent varieties, then in equilibrium both regions grow at the same rate. If there are no spillovers, so that knowledge capital depends on the measure of varieties in each region, then in general one region will dominate and the other will grow more slowly. These are features analysed by G&H and Devereux & Lapham (1994) . Thus to ensure that an equilibrium growth path is attained, with each region inventing a non-zero proportion of new goods, it is necessary to incorporate a spillover e ect. How can this be accomplished in such a way as to account for a Paci c Rim country possibly catching up and overtaking? A general representation for innovation knowledge capital (incorporating the density e ect outlined above) is the following, adapted from Grossman & Helpman (1990) :
so that there are spillovers from one region to another, but the rate of assimilation of one region's innovations into the knowledge capital of the other, captured by 0 < N ; S < 1, is not immediate. In particular there are gradual spillovers from Southern innovative activity to the North and from varieties invented and produced in the North, to the South. In the limit as N = S ! 1, assimilation is instant and if populations are the same, both Northern and Southern knowledge capital is proportional to the total number of varieties in the world, n = n N + n S c + n S i . Clearly whichever region assimilates the other's inventions the faster will be able to produce more new goods, and will have a higher stock of capital in the steady state. If one can satisfactorily describe how government policy in the South can be used to raise the value of S then one has a more comprehensive model of catching up and overtaking. But this question is not pursued in this paper. We now assume that the North is characterized by an advantage in assimilating knowledge capital from the rest of the world, i.e., N > S . We further simplify and accentuate this feature by letting N tends to in nity, i.e., the North assimilates knowledge capital instantly.
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In order to reduce subsequent notation, we set S = . With this assumption our representation for knowledge capital in the North replaces (7) with
6 With this assumption catching up by the South occurs as S increases, but overtaking can never happen.
Our formulation of knowledge capital largely removes population size e ects on growth; it is straightforward to show there are also no size e ects on levels of real variables such as the terms of trade when ! 1. With little loss of generality we therefore assume equal populations, i.e., L N = L S in the subsequent sections of the paper. This simpli cation is unimportant when innovation only takes place, as a transformation of variables from n b to n b =L b (b = S; N) will readily demonstrate. When imitation occurs, the population ratio L S =L N plays a role in the results; this is unsurprising, because the greater this ratio, the greater is the likelihood of imitation. Now consider the nancial sectors. Let the stock market value of the typical R&D rm in the production sectors producing innovative goods in the North We assume perfect capital mobility between production and R&D sectors in each region, but nancial autarky between regions. In the North the typical rm in production must take into account that, during the period of time dt, it will be imitated by the South and forced out of business with probability _ n S c =n N dt. This gives the no-arbitrage condition
where r b denotes the interest rate in bloc b. In the South we must take into account arbitrage between three assets: riskless bonds, and the equity of rms producing innovative and imitated goods. The no-arbitrage condition is then 
The model is closed with a labour market equilibrium condition for each region:
3. The Equilibria in Three Phases of Development The model set out above characterizes one of the three phases of development we are studying: innovation in the North and innovation alongside imitation (copying) in the South and imitation only in the South. The phase with imitation only in the South is obtained by putting n S i = 0 and suppressing the arbitrage condition (11). Similarly innovation only in the South is obtained by putting n S c = 0. The Northern innovation-Southern imitation case is examined in G&H but ignores international spillovers in knowledge capital, i.e., K N = (n N + n S c )=L N , and K S = n S c =L S in our formulation. This follows because in a wide-gap equilibrium the prices and therefore the pro ts and valuation of imitated and innovative goods in the South would then be the same. However, Southern innovation is more costly than imitation and would therefore not occur. Now consider the remaining narrow-gap equilibrium with both imitation and innovation in the South. From the demand and pricing equations, (1), (2), (3) and (5) (10) and (11), the NPV rules for R&D investment (9), the pricing equations (2), (3) and (5) with (13) and (14) 
Then equating (17) and (18) 
From (19), this leads to a relative wage ! = w S =w N , which will turn out to be the same over a range of values of , provided that a c =a is xed.
Equations (15), (16), (17) and (19) To examine the possibility of transition between the three equilibria of (i) Southern imitation only, (ii) Southern imitation and innovation and (iii) Southern innovation only, it is useful to think in terms of changes in the parameters a c =a and , re ecting the relative cost of copying and the speed at which the South absorbs knowledge capital from the North. In the absence of imitation in the South, the rate of imitation c = 0 and from (17) k = ! " . When tends to in nity, k = 1 (see (16)), the di erences between the two blocs disappear. We then arrive at factor price equalization as one expects. However, in general if the assimilation of international knowledge capital by the South is slower than that in the North ( < N < 1) our model exhibits a lower wage in the South even in the phase of innovation only in the South. At the other extreme as tends to 0, Southern imitation dominates and Southern innovation disappears.
The evolution of the South/North wage ratio with increasing as we pass from phase (ii) (Southern imitation and innovation) to phase (iii) (Southern innovation only) can be found from (17) Figure 1 is reached, the copying sector no longer exists in equilibrium, and (17) applies with c = 0; since relative Southern knowledge capital, k, increases with increasing , it follows that the relative wage increases too.
of during phase (ii). When the boundary in
Our more general formulation has a c = a c ( S c ), where this relationship between the cost of copying and the size of the imitative sector may be positive or negative. A positive relationship represents a diminishing returns to copying e ect as in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) , where imitators copy those products which are easiest to copy rst, so that the more di cult products to copy are associated with a higher a c . This obviously raises the question as to why the same argument does not apply to innovation (see Stokey (1995) ). A negative relationship implies that copying becomes easier as the copying sector increases in size. The rationale for this is that monitoring patents by innovators in the North becomes more di cult as the copying sector becomes bigger. If this e ect outweighs the diminishing returns to copying e ect then the relationship a c = a c ( S c ) is negative. We can investigate these e ects using The result is a consequence of equilibrium in output and nancial markets, i.e., the no-arbitrage conditions between Northern innovation, Southern imitation and innovation and the forgone returns on riskless bonds. As innovation becomes easier in the South, the incentive to imitate and therefore the rate of imitation, c, falls. Limit pricing requires a rise in pro ts in imitating Southern rms relative to Northern rms because of the reduction in the risk premium c. (See (18) ). This forces down the Southern relative wage !. Equivalently, the same relative Northern pro t can be maintained with a higher Northern relative wage rate because of the reduction in risk.
However, when imitation disappears in the South so does this latter e ect.
Then rates of return, b =v b , in Northern and Southern innovating rms are equalized (see (17) 
Stability and Transitional Dynamics
We now turn to the stability of the three equilibria. Assuming that the trade balance is zero, we can write the full dynamic model in terms of dynamic equations in g, k, N , S i and !, with g and ! as jump variables. Taking deviations about their equilibrium values we obtain an approximation to the dynamics by evaluating the Jacobian matrix. (See Appendix A.) Numerical simulations based on the calibration described in Appendix C show that the system is saddle-path stable for phase (i) (Southern imitation only) and phase (iii) (Southern innovation only), and these result proves robust for a wide range of parameter values about the central calibrated values. Table 2 summarizes the details of the calibration and the range of parameters adopted in the sensitivity analysis, each being changed keeping other parameters at their central values. For phase (ii), Southern innovation and imitation, we consider two cases. First consider the case where the e ect of increasing costs of monitoring da c =d S c < 0.
We nd that the system is saddle-path stable for the range of parameter values in Table 2 . In fact this result holds even for a very small value of da c =d S c . In the subsequent dynamic simulations of phase (ii) we replace a c with a c + S c with close to zero so that the equilibrium results remain virtually the same.
The stability result for da c =d S c < 0 can be explained as follows. Consider the (19). In Figure 2 its equilibrium value is indicated by point A. As an example of the dynamics of the system, suppose that N starts above and S c below their equilibrium levels. a c is therefore above its equilibrium level, since da c =d S c < 0 and the initial arbitrage level of ! is therefore at B where the relative wage, !, has fallen. This makes imitation more attractive because it raises the pro t rate relative to innovation and the rate of copying rises. The share of the Southern imitation sector therefore rises and that of Northern innovation falls. The relative wage ! gradually rises which eventually leads to the share of Southern innovation increasing back to is equilibrium value. Meanwhile the overall growth rate which dropped initially, also returns to its equilibrium value. (See i.e., the increasing costs of monitoring patents dominates diminishing returns to copying.
The details of the dynamics when saddle-path stability is absent, are complicated and treated fully elsewhere (Pearlman (1996) ). However, in essence what happens is that the South temporarily shifts to a regime of imitation only (together with production of previously imitated and innovative Southern products), which is coupled with a drop in the relative wage. The latter increases until such a point where there is an incentive for both imitation and innovation to take place. For the case of a c constant, this is exactly when the relative wage has reached its dynamic arbitrage (constant) value.
Subsidies to Innovation or Imitation
First consider an equilibrium with high when there is no imitation in the South. Suppose that the government nances a fraction N of all Northern research expenses by a lump-sum tax on residents; this lowers the private cost of invention to (1 ? N ) a=n. This in turn raises the pro t/valuation ratio which, assuming the no-arbitrage condition, is equal to g + . The subsidy to innovation raises the return from innovation, but leaves the return to production unchanged, and this induces a shift in labour resources from production to innovation. The positive spillover e ects from knowledge capital raise the return from innovation in the South as well, so that there is a shift in labour there as well in the same direction. The combined e ect is to raise the steady-state global growth rate. Similar arguments apply to subsidies to innovation in the South as well.
We can summarize this as follows:
Proposition 3. In an equilibrium with no Southern imitation (phase (iii)), a subsidy to either Northern or Southern innovation raises the steady-state growth rate.
Proof : Likewise, in an equilibrium with low , when there is no innovation activity in the South, a subsidy to Northern innovation raises the steady-state growth rate because of the shift in labour resources from production to innovation. In a narrow-gap equilibrium a subsidy to Southern imitation however, has no e ect on relative prices of the consumption goods produced by each region because of the strategic limit pricing assumption. Thus relative demands remain the same. Furthermore, unlike Northern subsidies to innovators which a ect Northern strategic interactions and hence prices and wage rates in both North and South, Northern prices and wages are una ected by Southern imitation subsidies. Hence growth remains unchanged. The only e ect is on Southern wages which increase. In a wide-gap equilibrium, which may exist for su ciently small when Southern imitation knowledge capital is less than Northern innovation knowledge capital, Southern rms charge a mark-up on Southern wages. Then a subsidy to imitation leads to relative demand changes and an increase in both imitation and growth rates. We summarize these results as:
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium with imitation only in the South (phase (i)), a subsidy to Northern innovation raises the steady-state growth rate. A subsidy to Southern imitation raises steady-state growth on a narrow-gap equilibrium, but has no e ect on the steady-state growth in a wide-gap equilibrium.
Proof: This phase of development is obtained by S i = 0 and suppressing ( 17). The proof is then similar to Proposition 3.
Consider now an equilibrium with both innovation and imitation in the South (phase (ii)). Analytical results are impossible to obtain, so we present numerical results in Tables 3 and 4 . The results of subsidizing the North, the Southern innovators and imitators are presented in Figure 5 . In this situation anything which induces more imitation represents a waste of resources and is likely to lower global knowledge capital and welfare. A subsidy to Northern innovation raises the return to innovation as before and thereby raises the relative wage rate in the North. However this raises the return to imitation in the South and induces a shift in labour resources from innovation to imitation in the South. The overall e ect is seemingly perverse in that the growth rate drops, although the share of Northern innovations and Southern imitations increases at the expense of Southern innovations. The e ects of a subsidy to imitation in the South has similar e ects. Again overall growth decreases and imitation increases while the share of Northern innovations and Southern imitations increases. However bene ts are derived from a subsidy to Southern innovation. In this case there is nothing which induces imitation in the South; indeed the imitation rate declines. Overall growth increases in both South and North (because of the spillover e ects), and the behaviour is similar to those seen in the equilibrium discussed above with no imitation in the South. Indeed for su ciently high subsidies to Southern innovation, imitation completely vanishes. These results are summarized as: Numerical Result 2. In an equilibrium with imitation and innovation in the South (phase (ii)) a subsidy to imitation in the South or innovation in the North can lower the steady-state growth rate. A subsidy to Southern innovation however raises the steady-state growth rate and can lead to a transition to phase (i) with no imitation in the South. 6. Conclusions We have presented a model of imitation and innovation which has the features of catching up (and potentially overtaking) which is most clearly relevant to the Paci c Rim economies. We have shown that equilibria including innovation and/or imitation depend on cross-country assimilation e ects and the ease of imitation. We have discussed the e ects of various di erent types of subsidy and have found the global bene ts occur when there is a subsidy to Southern innovation. There are some clear global policy implications which emerge from our analysis. Firstly, because the subsidies to Southern innovation bene t the North as well, it may well be in the interests of the North to pay for some of these subsidies, perhaps through transfer programs organized through the IMF and/or World Bank. Secondly, the bene ts of education should feed directly into the ability of the South to assimilate Northern knowledge and innovate; the consequent spillover e ects to growth and welfare make the subsidising of Southern education by the North particularly attractive.
But because of these knowledge spillovers and the associated externalities, policies aimed at fostering innovation and growth may be ine cient or suboptimal if they remain uncoordinated at an international level. This means that the institutions and associated rules that govern these policies matter for the growth performance of the international economy. Since ine ciencies may in uence the rate of growth as well as the level of output, the costs of ine cient policies may be very high. These issues are the subject of continuing research by the authors. In the South, maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint, and then using (9), (11) and (13) 
where ! = w S =w N . E S can be expressed as follows using (13) ( + g) and by assuming that the growth rate g = 0:03 per annum and the discount rate = 0:05. The ratio of the e ciency parameters a c =a is assumed to be 0.2, and a is normalized at unity. According to Krugman (1991) , a plausible mid-range estimate for the elasticity of substitution will be around 3, so we choose the value for to be 0.67. This yields a value for = 0:19.
